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SMOKE AND MIRRORS: TAX LEGISLATION,
UNCERTAINTY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
Linda A. Schwartzsteinf
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are exploring a new region, one in which, if you lose
your way, you are likely to lose everything. You packed carefully before
you left, and you have some idea of what your ultimate destination will
be and of how long it will take you to get there. Before leaving, you
evaluated the materials you own, the skills you have, and you acquired
whatever else you thought you would need to complement these materi-
als and skills.
Although you may be the first to take this particular path, the terri-
tory is not completely uncharted. There are certain landmarks you will
use to guide your way. You know the climate, the vegetation, and know
you can rely on the position of the stars to guide your way. You care-
fully calculate your costs of taking this journey, and the benefit you think
you will gain if you are successful. You know that if you are successful,
not only will you benefit, but also your entire community will benefit.
Deciding it is worth the risk, you begin. You are executing your plan,
and although unanticipated events occur, you manage to overcome any
obstacles. Sometimes you need to deviate from your plan. But because
of the stable signposts, there are boundaries you can rely on to help you
choose your course of action.
Now imagine that suddenly the stars change position. In addition,
for the first time in recorded memory, the always sunny climate turns
frigid; instead of grasslands, there is desert. Everything you relied on to
remain stable has become unstable.
I posit that our protagonist is analogous to the entrepreneur in our
society. By entrepreneur I mean someone who takes market risks to ad-
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vance economically, and to reap gains from production and trade.' The
entrepreneur may do this by developing new products, devising new pro-
duction processes, or by finding new organizational processes or trading
opportunities. In creating or exploiting opportunities, entrepreneurs con-
stantly have to make decisions regarding how to best utilize their tangi-
ble assets and their skill base.2 This necessitates reliance upon relatively
stable societal institutions, since knowledge of the boundaries within
which they are operating is necessary for entrepreneurs to be able to cal-
culate their expected returns.
I posit that the last fifteen to twenty years of tax legislation are
analogous to stars that constantly change their relative positions, unex-
pected landscapes, and unpredictable climactic changes. The Internal
Revenue Code has, in recent years, become the antithesis of a stable soci-
etal institution. Instead, its constant state of flux has created many im-
pediments to entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurs are no longer able to
depend on a stable tax environment; thus, they find it difficult to plan and
to predict returns on business activities. In all, this lack of tax code sta-
bility ultimately results in less investment, lower returns to investment,
and slower economic growth for the economy as a whole.
This Article proceeds as follows. Section II provides an overview
of recent tax legislation, highlighting several ways in which federal tax
law has increased in complexity. Section III presents a more detailed
discussion of the challenges of entrepreneurship, using Austrian eco-
nomic theory.3 Section IV then argues that revenue estimation, used to
shape and justify proposed tax legislation, has been relied on too greatly.
This section then discusses reasons, including methodological limitations
and political interference, why such revenue estimates must be viewed
more critically. Finally, Section V suggests a course for future tax
legislation.
1 Gary D. Libecap, Entrepreneurship, Property Rights and Economic Development, in 6
ADVANCES IN THE SiUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION AND GROWTH, at 69 (Gary D.
Libecap ed., 1993).
2 Id.
3 Austrian economics is a school of economic thought that has developed from the work
of Carl Menger, Ludwig von Mises, and Friedrich A. Hayek, among others. Austrian econom-
ics is more interpretive and less mathematically driven than neoclassical economics. Market
process, entrepreneurship, and the evolution of institutions have been major foci of the Aus-
trian school. For a comparison of law and economics, critical legal studies, and Austrian
economics, see Linda A. Schwartzstein, Austrian Economics and the Current Debate Between
Critical Legal Studies and Law and Economics, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1105 (1992). See also
Linda A. Schwartzstein, An Austrian Economic View of Legal Process, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1049
(1994) for the development of an evolutionary theory of legal institutions based on Austrian
economics. Israel M. Kirzner, Austrian School of Economics, in 1 THE NEw PALGRAVE: A
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, at 145 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) provides a brief history of
the Austrian school. For an account of the Austrian school as it has developed in the United
States, see KAREN I. VAUGHN, AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS IN AMERICA (1994).
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II. THE CHANGING FACE OF TAX LEGISLATION
An explosion of tax legislation has occurred over the last fifteen
years. After Congress enacted the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, con-
solidating tax law into a coherent code, there were relatively long periods
of time between significant tax bills. Major tax legislation was contained
in the Revenue Act of 1962,4 the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 5 and the Tax
Reform Act of 19766.
Between 1980 and 1996, however, Congress passed six major tax
bills - the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981,7 the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,8 the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,9
the Tax Reform Act of 1986,10 the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990,11 and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 199312. Each
of these bills affected myriad Internal Revenue Code (IRC) sections.13
Especially striking about the more recent tax legislation is that Congress
keeps making changes, then makes changes to the changes, and some-
times undoes what it did earlier. 14 A few examples will suffice to
4 Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960.
5 Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487.
6 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520.
7 Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
8 Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
9 Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494.
10 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
11 Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388.
12 Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
13 Harold I. Apolinsky, The Changes Just Cost Money, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1986, at C8
(documenting the number of code sections that changed between 1976 and 1984).
14 Several theories have been suggested regarding the reason there has been such an
increase in the amount of tax legislation in recent years. Professors Richard Doernberg and
Fred McChesney argue that politicians are maximizing the "rent seeking" potential of serving
on the Ways and Means Committee. They further suggest that more rapid turnover on the tax
legislative committees leads members of Congress and special interests to form short term
"contracts" for legislation, thus giving rise to more tax legislation. Richard L. Doernberg &
Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71
MINN. L. RV. 913 (1987). But see Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Inter-
est: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980's, 139 U.
PA. L. REv. 1, 63-80 (1990) (criticizing the contractual model as simplistic and adding nothing
in terms of a causal explanation). Although Jeffrey Birnbaum and Alan Murray generally saw
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 as a triumph of reform in the public interest over the special
interests, they did note the large contributions that were made to members of the tax writing
committees. JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH 181
(1987). For a criticism of their book, see Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, Doing
Good or Doing Well? Congress and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 891
(1987). Sheldon Pollack argues that tax reformists should be seen as having their own political
view they are trying to implement, but also criticizes the interest group literature. Sheldon D.
Pollack, Tax Reform: The 1980's in Perspective, 46 TAX L. REv. 489 (1991). Professor Alan
Blinder, former vice-chairman of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, suggests that the
way the agenda was set allowed tax reform to pass. First, by presenting tax reform as a whole
package, interest groups that would have objected to one part in isolation, could see how they
benefited from other aspects. Second, by requiring that any revenue losing amendment specify
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demonstrate the extent of these tax law changes over the past sixteen
years.
A. TAXATION OF NET CAPITAL GAINS
Net capital gains are measured by the excess of net long term capital
gains over net short term capital losses. For taxpayers above the low
marginal brackets, net capital gains have historically been taxed at a
lower rate than other taxable income. This reduction in tax rates was
accomplished by providing a deduction for net capital gains which in
effect excluded a portion of net capital gains from taxation. A deduction
for net capital gains was historically part of the revenue laws since 1922,
and from 1922 to the middle of 1981 remained at 50 percent. 15 Thus,
half of a taxpayer's net capital gain would be included in taxable income.
In 1981, the capital gains deduction was increased to 60 percent of
net capital gains, thus making the tax treatment of capital gains even
more favorable relative to ordinary income. 16 Due to the well-estab-
lished favorable treatment for capital gains, most taxpayers had strong
preferences for realizing capital gains instead of ordinary income. This
favorable treatment had many planning implications. For example, most
high bracket taxpayers would prefer to have successful corporations re-
tain earnings so that stock prices would rise, creating capital gains, rather
than distribute dividends which would be taxed at the higher rates im-
posed on ordinary income.
In 1986, however, Congress repealed the deduction for net capital
gains, but capped the maximum tax that would be imposed on net capital
gains at 28 percent. 17 This change had two major effects. First, the max-
imum effective rate of taxation on net capital gains after mid-1981 was
20 percent. After the repeal of the deduction, the maximum effective rate
how to replace the lost revenue, it became harder to advocate for tax breaks. ALAN S.
BLINDER, HARD HEADS, SOFT HEARTS 206-12 (1987). Other theories suggest that legislative
procedures are poorly suited to the tax writing process. See e.g., Paul McDaniel, Federal
Income Tax Simplification: The Political Process, 34 TEx. L. REv. 27 (1988). Similarly, the
suggestion has been made that reform of the procedures used for consideration of tax legisla-
tion has actually destabilized the process, making well reasoned tax legislation more difficult
to produce. See Catherine E. Rudder, Tax Policy: Structure and Choice, in MAKING ECO-
NOMIC POLICY IN CONGRESS 196, 196-220 (Alan Schick ed., 1983). Another theory is that the
system of revenues and expenditures has become so complex that legislators can only compre-
hend short term legislation. See generally CAROLYN WEBBER & AARON WiLDAVSKY, A HIs-
TORY OF TAXATION AND EXPENDITURE IN THE WESTERN WORLD (1986). In ALFRD L.
MALABRE, LOST PROPHETS 175-201 (1994), Malabre recounts the role of the media in promot-
ing supply side economics during the Reagan era.
15 See Why Can't America Get The Capital Gains Tax Right?, in THE CAPrrAL GAINS
CONTROVERSY: A TAX ANALYSTS READER, at 1, 3 (J. Andrew Hoemer ed., 1992) [hereinafter
THE CAPITAL GAINS CONTROVERSY].
16 Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
17 Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
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was 28 percent. Second, there was now less reason for a taxpayer to
prefer capital gains to ordinary income. This change in tax regime meant
that many investment decisions no longer produced the returns that were
expected based on the prior tax law, and many allocations of capital
needed to be rearranged.
In addition, although Congress was now taxing net capital gains at
the same rates as ordinary income, capital losses could only be deducted
against capital gains and a maximum of $3,000 of ordinary income.' 8
Although no longer justifiable, given that there was no benefit to realiz-
ing capital gains relative to ordinary income, Congress did not want to
repeal the limitation on capital losses because it feared the revenue loss
would be too great. Thus, the risk/reward ratio for capital gains and
losses was changed dramatically.
B. MARGINAL RATES OF TAXATION ON INDIVIDUALS AND
CORPORATIONS
In planning what business form to adopt, one factor to consider is
the marginal rates of taxation on corporate income compared to the mar-
ginal rates on individuals. Historically, the highest corporate rate has
always been lower than the highest individual rate. This relationship be-
tween the corporate and individual rate was maintained consistently until
1986. The relative rates of taxation were one reason why entrepreneurs
would choose to operate their business in corporate form. In 1986, Con-
gress changed this relationship for the first time so that the highest corpo-
rate marginal rate was now higher than the highest individual rate. Once
again, business expectations were disrupted. This change in the relative
rate structure meant that for many businesses, unincorporated business
forms such as limited partnerships were preferable to the corporate form.
Many businesses, including some fairly large corporations, were driven
to change their legal structure. In fact, a new business form, master lim-
ited partnerships, quickly developed. Unlike the typical limited partner-
ships, whose interests are not publicly traded, master limited partnerships
interests are traded on the stock exchanges like shares in a corporation.
This allowed publicly traded corporations to transform themselves into
master limited partnerships so that income would be taxed at the individ-
ual rates of their partners, as opposed to at the corporate rates. Congress
was so concerned about this development that it responded by amending
the Internal Revenue Code to require master limited partnerships to be
taxed as corporations. 19
18 I.R.C. § 1211(b) (1986).
19 Id. § 7704.
1996]
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Ironically, given the disruption caused by the change in relative
marginal rates, this change was short-lived. In 1993, Congress raised the
highest marginal rates on individual income above that of the highest
marginal corporate rate.20 Now, once again, it is more advantageous for
profitable businesses, especially if they expect to retain earnings, to be in
corporate form. Entrepreneurs had to readjust their expectations and
reformulate their plans to factor in the latest shift in the structure of
taxation. 21
C. DEPRECIATION
The deduction for depreciation allows a business to recover their
capital investments in long lived assets such as factories and equipment.
Because these assets are productive over periods of more than one year,
Congress has provided for their costs to be recovered over time so as to
more accurately reflect income. If, for example, a widget making
machine has a useful life of five years, deducting the entire cost of the
machine in the first year against the income produced from making wid-
gets would overstate costs and understate income in the first year, and
understate costs and overstate income in the following years. Con-
versely, not allowing any deduction for the cost of the widget making
machines would overstate the income from the widget making business.
The depreciation deduction, which allows part of the cost of the machine
to be deducted each year, theoretically more accurately matches income
with the costs of producing that income.
Congress has recognized, however, that allowing businesses accel-
erated recovery of their costs lowers the ultimate cost of capital invest-
ment. As a result, Congress has allowed businesses to utilize certain
methods of accelerated depreciation, which allows more of the cost of
investment to be deducted in the early years. In the Economic Recovery
Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981,22 Congress decided to greatly accelerate the
depreciation rates and shorten the recovery period that businesses could
use to recover their capital investment. For example, the recovery period
for real property under prior law had ranged from forty years to sixty
years.23 Under ERTA, the recovery period for real property was short-
ened to fifteen years, although the taxpayer could elect longer recovery
20 Pub. L. No 103-66, 107 Stat. 312.
21 Glenn E. Coven, Congress as Indian-Giver: "Phasing Out" Tax Allowances Under
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 6 VA. TAX REv. 505 (1987) (describing the effect of
phasing out tax allowances for individuals on their effective rates).
22 Pub. L. No 97-34, 95 Stat. 172.
23 The forty year recovery period applied to apartments; the sixty year period to ware-
houses. The average period claimed was between 32 and 43 years. INTERNAL REVENUE AcTs
1980-1981 at 1442 (citing Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 C.B. 418).
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periods.24 Recovery periods on personal property were also shortened.
Congress, however, soon decided that it had been too generous. Partly
because of the recession that began in 1981, and partly because the accel-
erated depreciation greatly reduced tax revenue, Congress repealed the
more rapid depreciation it had legislated for personal property in future
years in Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982.25 In 1986,
Congress again modified the depreciation rates and recovery periods, es-
pecially for real estate. Real estate was limited to straight line methods
of depreciation and the recovery period was increased to 31.5 years. 26
In addition, the value of deductions varies with changes in tax rates.
The higher the marginal tax rate the more of the cost underlying the
deduction is shared with the government. Thus, the rate changes that
have occurred over the last fifteen years have continually changed the
economic consequences of investments that have already been made.
The instability in the tax laws makes it almost impossible to predict with
any confidence what the return on any investment will be.
D. ADDED COMPLEXITY
In 1913, when Congress enacted the first income tax law, it envi-
sioned that taxpayers would "willingly and cheerfully" comply with the
income tax law and that it would require merely a part of one day to fill
out the necessary forms.27 Today, however, it is estimated that as a
country we spend five billion hours28 and $200 billion29 on compliance
with the income tax laws.
Every time the tax law is changed, information costs are imposed on
the taxpayers. Every amendment to the tax law requires that all those
who are affected learn of the change, gain sufficient knowledge to under-
24 Id. at 1450.
25 Pub. L. No 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
26 Pub. L. No 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). Real estate was hit especially hard by the
Tax Reform of 1986. Not only were the greatly accelerated depreciation repealed, but Con-
gress also enacted the passive loss rules, which limited the deductions passive partners in real
estate limited partnerships were allowed. See I.R.C. § 501 (1986). The result was that real
estate investment went from a traditionally tax favored activity to a much less attractive invest-
ment. In addition, the passive loss rules were applied to investments that had already been
made, not just to future investments. Taxpayers who had made their investments based on
economic calculations formulated on the prior tax regime were left holding investments that no
longer made economic sense. These changes in the taxation of real estate are believed to have
been a major factor in the decline in the real estate market, which led to the savings and loan
debacle. Carl Felsenfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. S7, S32 nn.164-
65, S43 (1991).
27 H.R. Rep. No. 5, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1913). The first income tax had a top margi-
nal rate of four percent on taxable income over $100,000.
28 Flat Tax of 1995: Hearings on S. 488 Before the House Ways & Means Comm., 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. 477 (1995) (testimony of Senator Arlen Specter).
29 Daniel Mitchell, Which Tax Reform Plan is Best for America?, HERrrAGE FOUND.,
Sep. 26, 1995 (citing a study by the Tax Foundation).
68 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
stand its application, and determine how to respond to it. Sweeping
changes in the law, such as the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986, impose
enormous information costs on taxpayers. After the Tax Reform Act of
1986, one accounting firm advised: "Describing [the TRA] and sug-
gesting ways to tackle and master its stunning breadth and depth are
tasks that will challenge the taxpayer and tax adviser .... The magnitude
of change cannot be overstated. '30 Only a few years later, taxpayers
were asked to absorb further significant changes in tax law.31
Most statutory language is subject to a variety of interpretations,
and so it will not always, and perhaps not usually, be clear how the tax
law will be applied. Treasury regulations and other official guidance can
often lag years and sometimes decades behind amendments to the law. 32
It can take years of IRS rulings and litigation before an interpretation of a
tax statute is settled. In the meantime, taxpayers must deal with the un-
certainty of their tax position. 33
These costs of tax legislation are not included in the estimates of
revenue gains and losses expected to be generated by changes in the tax
laws. It would probably be very difficult to find a way to measure the
productivity lost from resources used to learn and comply with the new
legislation. Intuitively, however, it seems clear the loss must be substan-
tial. An indication of how much tax complexity costs can be made based
on the amounts spent for professional tax assistance. 34
Sheldon Pollack, in reviewing modem tax legislation, concluded:
The result is tax "laws," such as the passive activity loss
rules, that defy the very notion of "rule by law." These
are not laws in the traditional sense that the citizenry can
take notice of, and accordingly plan their actions. Quite
the contrary, it is unclear what activity or behavior is
forbidden... and which are sanctioned.. . -the very
essence of the rule of law. In many ways, it appears as if
the rule of law, a principal central to our liberal political
30 ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., TAX REFORM 1986: ANALYSIS AND PLANNING 3-4 (1986)
(quoted in TIMOTHY J. CONLAN ET AL., TAXING CHOICES 2 (1990)).
31 See discussion in section B, supra.
32 Thomas F. Field et al., The Guidance Deficit: A Statistical Study, 69 TAX NOTES 1023
(1995).
33 Sheldon Pollack characterizes the Treasury's attempt to provide regulations to imple-
ment the broad scheme Congress enacted regarding passive activity losses in 1986 as follows:
"The resulting passive activity loss regulations are comprehensive and complicated (which
means incomprehensible to taxpayers, the judges who actually adjudicate disputes over the
interpretation of the federal statute and even many tax lawyers who deal with them on a fre-
quent basis)." Pollack, supra note 14, at 527 (footnotes omitted).
34 Joel Slemrod & Nikki Sorum, The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax
System, 37 NAT'L TAX J. 461 (1984). See also JOEL SLEMROD & MARSHA BLUMENTHAL, Tim
INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE COST OF BIG BusINEss (1993).
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culture, has been largely abandoned in the realm of tax
law? 5
The abundancy of major changes in the tax laws over the past dec-
ade means entrepreneurs have less confidence in the tax laws. Also, such
frequent changes will tend to focus entrepreneurs' efforts on more short
term planning, as they find that modifications of the tax laws upset their
expectations.3 6
m. THE MARKET PROCESS AND ENTREPRENEURIAL
DECISIONMAKING
Entrepreneurs must constantly make decisions in the context of un-
certainty.37 An entrepreneur includes anyone who tries to capture market
opportunities and who makes decisions within a business about the allo-
cation of resources, about what product to develop and how to develop it,
or a person who develops a new organizational structure, or new methods
of doing things.38 Entrepreneurs can be found at many levels in any or-
ganization. Entrepreneurial ability is becoming more and more impor-
tant in the global economy. Professor Rosabeth Moss Kantor explains
why:
In a sense, every business today, not just those in the
garment trade, is a "fashion" business. To compete ef-
fectively, companies must innovate continually and in
ever shorter cycles. Keeping customers as well as at-
tracting new ones requires constantly offering new and
better products, with design innovations based on new
technologies. To be truly customer oriented, managers
35 Pollack, supra note 14, at 529. See also American Bar Association, Section of Busi-
ness Law Ad Hoc Committee on Tax Reform, Tax Reform: The Business Perspective, 41 Bus.
L. 907 (1986).
36 A recent example occurred when the Clinton Administration proposed disallowing the
interest deduction on any corporate issued debt instrument that had a term of forty years or
more. Deals involving hundreds of millions of dollars were suddenly put into limbo and some
were torpedoed completely. Tom Herman & Anita Raghuvan, Derailment of Several Bond
Offerings by New Tax Plan Considered Likely, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 1995, at A3. Eric M.
Zolt, Corporate Taxation After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A State of Disequilibrium, 66'N.C.
L. REV. 839 (1988), argues that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Revenue Act of 1987
upset the balance between individual and corporate tax resulting in unanticipated conse-
quences and could affect taxpayer decisions regarding fundamental business decisions such as
choice of business form, financing, and dividend policy in undesirable ways. See also Doug-
las A. Kahn, Should General Utilities be Reinstated to Provide Partial Integration of Corpo-
rate and Personal Income-Is Half a Loaf Better than None?, 13 J. Coiu. L. 953 (1988)
(arguing that Congress should reinstate the General Utilities doctrine which was repealed in
1986 and which had provided nonrecognition for corporate income tax purposes for gains on
corporate property distributed to shareholders in certain distributions).
37 See Libecap, supra note 1, at 69.
38 Id.
19961
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must be concerned about what they do not yet see.
Where there is a customer wish but no way yet to fulfill
it, there is an opportunity for innovation. Fulfill it your-
self, or someone else will. Surrounding every business
are both invisible opportunities-customers' hopes and
dreams-and invisible enemies-new companies
outside the country or outside the industry possessing ca-
pabilities better able to fulfill these hopes.39
The Austrian school of economics theory of capital provides insight
into the process of entrepreneurial decision making. Although focused
on decisions regarding capital, the decision making process illustrated by
Austrian capital theory can be applied to any aspect of entrepreneurial
decision making. Viewing the production process from an Austrian eco-
nomic perspective, the impact of uncertainty becomes apparent.
Beginning with Friedrich A. Hayek's The Pure Theory of Capital4°
and continuing with Ludwig Lachmann's work on capital structure,41
Austrian economists have been concerned with examining the structure
of capital, specifically with respect to how entrepreneurs will decide
what capital investments to make at any given time and how best to util-
ize the capital stock that they currently own.42 Capital stock is not a
static concept. The capital stock of an entrepreneur at any given point in
time reflects the outcome of past activities and also represents the basis
of plans for future activity. 43
Choices regarding the capital stock must be viewed at the level of
the individual firm. At this level it is possible to observe the production
plans of the entrepreneur. Different plants even in the same industry will
have different combinations of capital because of differences in expecta-
tions of the future over time and because of product differentiation. It is
in these individual plants, with their particular combinations of buildings,
39 ROSABETH Moss KANTOR, WORLD CLASS 50 (1995).
40 F.A. HAYEK, THE PURE THEORY OF CAPITAL (1941) (Midway reprint 1975). Hayek
built on the work of EUGENE VON BOHM-BAWERK, CAPITAL AND INTEREST (1899) and Ludwig
von Mises. However, Hayek, among other Austrian economists including Mises, disagreed
with many aspects of Bohm-Bawerk's works. F.A. Hayek, The Mythology of Capital, 50
Q.J.E. 199 (1936); Israel M. Kirzner, Ludwig von Mises and the Theory of Capital, in THE
ECONOMICS OF LUDWIG VON MISES (Laurence S. Moss ed., 1976). Mises had apparently
planned to write a study of capital but did not, so his views have to be gleaned from scattered
remarks in his writings. He did view it as meaningless to use a concept of a totality of capital
goods, a view that Hayek and Lachmann develop in greater depth. Id. at 52-53.
41 LUDWIG LACHMANN, CAPITAL AND ITS STRUCTURE 2 (1978). See generally LUDWIG
LACHMANN, THE MARKET AS AN ECONOMIC PROCESS (1949).
42 Because of this focus, Lachmann distinguishes Austrian capital theory from capital
theory that focuses mainly on interest rates, such as in R. SOLOW, CAPITAL THEORY AND THE
RATE OF RETURN (1963). LUDWIG LACHMANN, CAPITAL AND ITS STRUCTURE vii (1978). See
also Lachman, supra note 41, at 59-62.
43 ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, DISCOVERY AND THE CAPITALIST PROCESS 43 (1985).
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equipment, property, and working capital, that the individualized nature
of the capital stock is evident.44 Each firm, as Lachmann stated, reflects
"the mark of the individuality of its leading minds. '45 Determining de-
preciation and the timing of new capital investments is a difficult pro-
cess, which can easily lead to malinvestment. Further, any
malinvestment by a firm will very likely have ripple effects in other parts
of the economy, due to the interrelationship of the various sectors of the
economy. The more rapidly the world is changing, the more likely
malinvestment will occur.46
Capital resources can be utilized in a multitude of ways. However,
any individual capital asset has a limited number of uses.47 Economic
theories and models that treat capital as homogenous hide the reality that
entrepreneurs have to make choices regarding how to combine and use
capital assets. The composition of the capital stock and the difficulty
often encountered in attempts to disinvest are never considered in eco-
nomic theory that looks at capital as homogenous. 48
An owner of capital goods will attempt to use each good in its
optimal capacity. What that optimal capacity is will change as circum-
stances change. Some goods will end up being used for purposes other
than for which they were designed because they no longer are useful for
their original purpose. Such uses may be more or less profitable than the
original one.49 Until the entrepreneur determines how to use assets in
order to produce income, the assets are just things, not capital. They
become capital as the entrepreneur employs them to produce income.50
In addition, most capital resources must be used in conjunction with
others in order to be productive. Although there is complementarity with
respect to capital resources, capital resources are not combined arbitrar-
ily. Only certain combinations are technologically possible. The entre-
preneur must discover which of these combinations are possible and try
to choose the optimal combination available at a given time.51 Any such
choice, however, will have a limited life, as circumstances will undoubt-
edly change, whether from new discoveries, technological changes, or
other changes in the economy.
In order to analyze how capital responds to unexpected change, one
has to look at capital not as a homogenous aggregate, but as a structure
made up of capital combinations that will develop, dissolve, and emerge
44 LACHMANN, supra note 42, at ix.
45 Id. at ix.
46 Id. at x.
47 Lachmann refers to this as the multiple specificity of capital goods. Id. at 2.
48 Id. at 49.
49 Id. at 3.
50 Id. at xv.
51 Id. at 3.
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in different structures as change occurs.52 At some point, the entrepre-
neur makes a production plan for a given period of time and employs
capital goods in pursuit of that plan. This capital combination will be
maintained as long as the envisioned goal is being met.53
Rather than modeling the future based on past experience in a deter-
ministic manner, an entrepreneur's own experience and viewpoint will
lead him or her to take different actions based on his or her particular
observations, beliefs, and conclusions. 5 4 Lachmann argued that the most
interesting part of entrepreneurial interpretation of past experience is the
formation of expectations:
Expectations, i.e., those acts of the entrepreneurial mind
which constitute his "world," diagnose "the situation" in
which action has to be taken, and logically precede the
making of plans, are of crucial importance for process
analysis. A method of dynamic analysis which fails to
allow for variable expectations due to subjective inter-
pretation seems bound to degenerate into a series of eco-
nomically irrelevant mathematical exercises. 55
Entrepreneurs make subjective judgments about what information is
useful and important to their decision making process. These judgments
will be confirmed, refuted, or modified by their experience and their in-
terpretation of that experience.5 6
Because the production process takes time, a fact emphasized by
Austrian capital theory, the businessperson is actually facing a series of
production processes that are in various stages of completion at any
given time. No given group of resources will automatically produce a
particular flow of output. One cannot simply take a present value of fu-
ture income streams for such resources and expect it to be a meaningful.
While formulating and implementing a production plan, the entrepreneur
has opportunities to reshape his or her plans and to respond to his or her
perceptions of changes in the market.57 What any particular group of
resources will produce will always depend on what use the entrepreneur
52 Id. at 13.
53 Lachmann refers to this method as Plan-Period Analysis. To the extent we need to
look beyond the given period, to the next period, to see what happens in that period as a result
of what happened in this one, Lachmann refers to this as Process Analysis. Id. at 13.
54 Lachmann further observed, "The econometricians have thus far failed to explain why
in an uncertain world the meaning of past events should be the only certain thing, and why its
'correct' interpretation by entrepreneurs can always be taken for granted." Id. at 15.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 22.
57 FRiEDRICH A. HAYEK, Economics and Knowledge, in L.S.E. ESSAYS ON COST 48-49
(James M. Buchanan & G.F. Thirlby eds., 1981).
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decides to make of them.58 Any aggregate measure of capital as a basis
for predicting the performance of an economy will fail to take into ac-
count plan failures. As there is more specialization in the market, there
is also a need for more coordination among individual production plans
if the economy is to be productive.5 9 Often, one firm produces the raw
material, another manufactures the equipment that is used in a particular
process, a third actually uses the raw materials and the equipment to
produce a good for sale, and other firms may act as wholesaler or re-
tailer. Although this coordination generally takes place in the market-
place, the market process cannot make all plans interlock perfectly
except in an ideal state of equilibrium with all tastes, technology, and
other factors held constant.60 More realistically, some plans are carried
out as expected, some firms suffer disappointments, and some plans are
more profitable than expected. The more complex and specialized the
economy, the less likely it will be that anywhere near perfect coordina-
tion will result.
Austrian capital theory suggests why changes in the tax regime can
have an extremely disruptive effect on the market process. Contrary to
neoclassical economic theory, which tends to treat capital as homoge-
nous, Austrian capital theory stresses the heterogeneity of capital re-
sources.61 Any particular capital good can be used only for a limited
number of purposes. The entrepreneur attempts to employ capital re-
sources to their highest and best perceived use. Any unexpected change
in the market environment can alter what that use should be. The origi-
58 KIRzNER, supra note 43, at 18.
59 HxAE, supra note 57, at 48-49.
60 KiRzNER, supra note 43, at 29. Kirzner further notes:
Careful reflection on the matter will, it is believed, reveal that the aggregate concept
of capital, the "quantity of capital available to the economy as a whole," is for a
market economy, a wholly artificial construct useful for making certain judgments
concerning the progress and performance of the economy. When using this con-
struct one is in fact viewing the economy in its entirety as if it were not a market
economy but instead a completely centralized economy over which the observer
himself has absolute control and responsibility. When, for example, one is con-
cerned with the size of the stock available to society in a forward-looking sense,
what one is really thinking is as follows. Supposing one were to be able to draw up
a complete social listing of output priorities and supposing one were in command of
all the information necessary to formulate centralized production plans for the future,
what is the additional flow of this "social output" during future years, that is to be
ascribed to the presence of the nation's stock of capital. One is thus not merging the
plans of all the individual capital owners who participate in the market economy, one
is conceptually replacing these plans by a single master plan that one imagines to be
relevant to the economy as a whole, and against which one gauges the performance
of the economy as a whole.
Id.
61 LACHMANN, supra note 42, at 2.
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nal plan of the entrepreneur will then have to be changed.62 These dis-
ruptions to the plans of the entrepreneur have an impact not just on him,
but on all the other industries with which he interacts. Lachmann de-
scribed this process as follows:
Unexpected change, whenever it occurs, will make pos-
sible, or compel, changes in the use of capital goods. It
will thus cause the disintegration of existing capital con-
tributions. Even where it opens up new and promising
possibilities for some resources it will open them up for
some, not for all. The rest will have to be turned to sec-
ond-best uses. 63
All unexpected change causes capital gains and capital
losses. 64
Tax law changes can be expected to create a drag on the economy,
as entrepreneurs have to reformulate their plans to accommodate new tax
consequences. Dislocations in the form of unanticipated opportunities or
foreclosed possibilities will occur, creating windfall gains and windfall
losses. In effect, maladjustments are being continually created through
legislation. 65
In addition, as entrepreneurs face increasing instability in the tax
regime in which they operate, one could expect them to reduce the speci-
ficity of the capital resources they invest in and produce in order to pro-
vide more options in the event of a change in the tax laws. In examining
the tax legislative process, it is also important to consider the effect of
tax law changes on the subjective cost evaluations of the taxpayer/entre-
preneur. Tax legislation is a disequilibrating force in the decision mak-
ing framework of the individual. By changing the environment in which
the individual operates and changing the relative prices in the economy,
tax legislation creates the need for adjustments.
Entrepreneurs must make predictions about future prices, consumer
demand, capital investment, which forms of capital to use, production
process, and labor availability, under conditions of uncertainty and rap-
idly changing information. The true opportunity cost of tax legislation is
the alternative entrepreneurial plans that were precluded or abandoned. 66
62 Id. at 3.
63 Id. at 3-4.
64 Id. at 52.
65 Don Lavoie, The Development of the Misesian Theory of Interventionism, in METHOD,
PROCESS AND AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS 169, 180 (Israel M. Kirzner ed., 1982).
66 James M. Buchanan, Introduction: L.S.E. Cost Theory in Retrospect, in L.S.E. ESSAYS
ON COST 14 (James M. Buchanan & G. F. Thirlby eds., 1973) ("Cost is that which the deci-
sionmaker sacrifices or gives up when he selects one alternative rather than another.").
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These costs are hidden because they represent the path not taken and they
cannot be observed or measured.67
Understanding the difficulty of entrepreneurial decisions makes it
clear why constant changes in a legislative institution such as tax law
can be damaging to the market process in ways that are impossible to
quantify. When tax laws are changed, economic agents must learn what
those changes are, predict the economic impact on their industry and
interrelated industries, on consumers, and on their production plans, and
modify their course of action accordingly. Not all market participants
will do this successfully.68
Econometric models draw attention away from opportunity costs.
Models tend to disregard or assume away facts that cannot be measured
or quantified in any way and about which only imprecise or general
knowledge is available.69 These omissions can create real problems in
revenue estimation. 70 When tax law modifications change relative
prices, resources are diverted from the use to which they would have
been put absent the change. The opportunity cost of the modification of
the tax law is measured by the foregone use of these resources in their
67 Jonathan Hughes suggested:
If a business firm is "nothing but a production function," then the student of busi-
ness will, perforce, have no interest in entrepreneurial action. It isn't necessary to
determine efficient and inefficient inputs, outputs, costs and revenues. The student
can do all that at the blackboard without knowledge of entrepreneurial decisions.
But there is a deep problem here. In the world of the economist's formal model of
the firm, there is no development, no evolution. If anyone believes the model to be a
model of reality, or a reasonable facsimile thereof, the study of the model is mislead-
ing. The model itself yields no information about the real world. The model is a
model of itself.
Jonathan Hughes, American Economic History and the Entrepreneur, in 6 ADVANCES IN THE
SrUDY oF ENTREPRENEURsHp, INNOVATION AND GROWTH 1, 3 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 1993)
(footnotes omitted). Hughes also commented that it was no surprise that graduate economic
students were not interested in the real world, finding it "too messy, time consuming to study
and too ephemeral." Id. Hughes states that he was greeted with skepticism and the accusation
that he had "given up economics" when he wrote THE VrrTAL. FEw, which describes the role of
early entrepreneurs in American history. See also JONATHAN HUGHES, THE VrrAL FEW (1966).
68 GERALD P. O'DRIscO.L & MARIO Rrzzo, THE ECONOMICS OF TIME AND IGNORANCE
133 (1985). O'Driscoll and Rizzo discuss the difficulty the airlines had in moving from a
regulated to an unregulated environment.
69 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Pretense of Knowledge, 79 AM. EON. REv. 3 (1974).
70 One commentator states:
Many academic researchers failed to get involved n detailed structural issues, partly
because they were ignorant of the many details of tax and expenditure law and often
couldn't incorporate such details into their simple models of the economy, even if
they were aware of them. In a self-deceptive way, issues became defined as unim-
portant because they weren't in one's economic model.
C. EUGENE STEUERLE, THE TAX DECADE 84 n. 11 (1992). Steuerle held numerous positions in
the Treasury Department for most of the 1980's, including head of the economic staff analyz-
ing domestic tax policy, Economic Tax Coordinator of Treasury's 1984-86 Project for Funda-
mental Tax Reform, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Analysis.
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highest alternative use. Opportunity cost should be an extremely impor-
tant consideration in tax policy. However, since it is impossible to know
ex ante what the alternative uses of resources would have been, opportu-
nity costs are largely ignored.71
For example, when Congress is considering enacting an incentive,
econometric models will be used to provide estimates of the overall reve-
nue effect of the incentive. This estimate will provide an indication of
the extent to which the incentive is expected to attract resources to the
targeted activity given the underlying assumptions used in the model.
This estimate, which will look like a concrete amount, is in reality an
estimate of objective costs. However, it will not be possible to know
exactly from where the resources will be drawn. Without knowing the
subjective valuations of taxpayers, it cannot be clear which of the activi-
ties that are now relatively more expensive will be sacrificed in the pur-
suit of the targeted activity. There is no way of knowing the value of
alternative investment opportunities without the actual investment. Thus,
the opportunity cost of the incentive will be unknown and largely over-
looked. However, the shift in investment that occurs will be crucial to
the overall revenue impact of the tax legislation and its effect on the
economy.72
Tax legislation upsets existing relative prices, whether the legisla-
tion is in the form of incentives, disincentives, or wealth transfers. Given
the inherent limitations of econometric models, the disequilibrating effect
of tax legislation, and the disregard of opportunity cost, it is perhaps not
surprising that more frequent tax legislation is being promulgated. As
the results are not what was anticipated, or as new problems arise be-
cause of the way resources are reallocated, further intervention is neces-
sary to "correct" the economy. Further, as increasing reliance has been
placed on econometric models, the frequency of tax legislation has also
increased.
Societal institutions should provide a stable framework to help en-
trepreneurs function in the midst of so much uncertainty.73 Tax law, a
legislatively created institution, affects both entrepreneurial decision-
71 For a critique of econometrics from an Austrian perspective, see Mario J. Rizzo, Prax-
eology and Econometrics: a Critique of Positivist Economics, in NEw DIRECTIONS IN Aus-
TRIAN ECONOMICS 40 (Louis M. Spadaro ed., 1978).
72 Israel Kirzner discusses the effects of two types of tax incentives. KIRzNER, supra
note 43, at 93-118.
73 See generally LUDWIG LACHMANN, THE FLow OF LEGISLATION AND THE PERMANENCE
OF LEGAL ORDER (1979) (reprinted in EXPECTATIONS AND THE MEANING OF INSTITUTIONS 249
(Don Lavoie ed., 1994)); Mario J. Rizzo, Rules versus Cost-Benefit Analysis, in ECONOMIC
LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY 233 (James A. Dom & Henry G. Manne eds., 1987) ("If the law
cannot systematically achieve specific goals, then the best it can do is provide a stable order in
which individuals are free to pursue their own goals.").
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making and the profitability of a chosen course of action.74 To the extent
the tax law is stable and certain, entrepreneurs can make useful predic-
tions concerning the impact of taxation on their production plans. When
tax law is changed frequently, however, the result is to add significant
uncertainty to the planning process and to cause unexpected gains or
losses simply due to changes in the incidence of taxation.75 Frequent
change in tax legislation increases entrepreneurial uncertainty and, as a
result, makes it more difficult for entrepreneurs to formulate plans and
develop strategies.
IV. REVENUE ESTIMATION
In the Congressional Budget Act of 1974,76 Congress imposed a
requirement that all new tax legislation had to include an estimate of
revenue gains and losses projected over five years. Since then, the tax
legislative process has been increasingly shaped by these estimates.
Congressional concern over the large deficits that followed the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 due to the large tax reduction provided in that
Act, the recession, high interest rates, and a slowing of inflation led to
the perceived need to raise revenue. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act
(formally the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act), 77
which set deficit targets and automatic spending cuts if those targets
were not reached, and the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990,78 which
replaced the deficit targets with spending targets and potential sequestra-
tion of entitlements, have made revenue estimates extremely important. 79
In addition, tax acts such as the Tax Reform Act of 1986 were formed
under political agreements that the bill would be revenue neutral.80 The
concept of revenue neutrality (that is tax legislation that neither raises
nor lowers overall tax revenues) has continued to be important. Thus,
most proposals for legislation must be accompanied by estimates of reve-
nue gains or losses, and if losses are expected, then the proposal must
indicate how the shortfall will be recovered.
As a result, estimates of revenue gains and losses currently domi-
nate the tax legislative process and have determined the shape of much
74 Libecap, supra note 1, at 70.
75 Todd J. Zywicki, A Countervailing Model of Efficiency in the Common Law: An Insti-
tutional Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions to Large-Number Externality
Problems, 46 CASE WESTERN L. REv. 961 (1996) (asserting that the only way individuals can
accurately estimate costs is when the framework in which those costs were estimated is
preserved).
76 Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (§ 403).
77 Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037.
78 Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388.
79 Emil M. Sunley & Randall D. Weiss, The Revenue Estimating Process, TAX NoTES
(June 10, 1991) (reprinted in THE CAPrrAL GMANS Comrcov.RsY, supra note 15).
80 Id. at 460.
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tax legislation. These concepts mean that more and more reliance is be-
ing placed on econometric models. Congress and the Executive Branch
generally base their econometric studies on data from different govern-
ment offices. The official Congressional revenue estimates for tax law
changes are made by the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT). This func-
tion gives the JCT enormous influence in the tax legislative process.81
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates federal receipts under
current law. CBO also provides JCT with the revenue baseline to use in
making its revenue estimates.8 2 The baseline serves as a benchmark for
estimating the effect of proposed changes in tax laws. This is an estimate
of the Federal revenues that would be generated over the next five years
assuming no changes in the law. In making its revenue estimates, JCT
relies on tax return data provided by the IRS, along with nontax data
from other government agencies, as needed. When government data is
unavailable, JCT uses data from "leading" economists, consultants, or
research organizations among others.83 Infrequently, the only data avail-
able is from the proponents of the legislation. 84 The Executive Branch
relies on the Office of Tax Analysis (OTA) within the Treasury Depart-
ment to prepare revenue estimates. The baseline for these estimates is
provided by macroeconomic assumptions generally formulated by the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), along with the Council of
Economic Advisors and the Office of Economic Policy in Treasury.
These three groups are often referred to as the Troika. 85
Generally, there are three types of econometric studies that are used
to analyze tax legislation: cross-sectional, time series, and longitudinal or
panel studies. Cross-sectional studies examine data regarding capital
gains realizations on a large group of taxpayers, including taxpayers at
each marginal tax rate over a single taxable year. The drawbacks of
cross-sectional studies is that because they look at one year in isolation,
they do not reveal whether changes in realizations are temporary or per-
manent and thus do not reflect macroeconomic effects, such as GNP
growth or inflation.86
81 CoNLAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 90, 244. Conlan, Wrightson, and Beam quote an
unidentified member of the Ways and Means Committee as saying, "If I had really wanted to
influence the way the actual law was written, I would have applied for a job on the Joint Tax
or Ways and Means staff." Id. at 244.
82 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 102D CONG., 2D SEss., DIscussIoN OF REVENUE ESTIMA-
TION METHODOLOGY AND PRACIcE 3 (Comm. Print Aug. 13, 1992, JCS-14-92) [hereinafter
REVENUE ESTIMATION].
83 Id. at 6.
84 Id.
85 STEUERLE, supra note 70, at 52.
86 EXPLANATION OF METHODOLOGY USED TO ESTIMATE PROPOSALs AFFECTING THE TAX-
ATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL GAINS PREPARED BY THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON
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Panel studies use data on a cross-section of taxpayers but follows
them for two to three years. Few panel studies have been made, and
most of them suffer from poor data, or poor technique or a poor choice of
tax years to study.8 7
Finally, time-series studies uses data relating to many years, but for
aggregate groups of taxpayers, not for the same group. These studies are
limited, however, because there is no data for any individual taxpayer
As a result, the tax rate variable used will be some sort of average or
hypothetical tax rate that may not have actually applied to any specific
taxpayer, and any individual specific tax attributes, such as the amount of
interest and dividends received by a taxpayer in a given year, cannot be
taken into account.88 With time series data it is difficult to determine the
independent effect of any single variable and much information on varia-
tion across individuals is lost. Also, time-series studies tend to be based
on relatively few observations.8 9 However, time-series studies can better
reflect changes in macroeconomic variables. 90
The JCT and the Treasury Department will often produce signifi-
cantly different revenue estimation for proposed legislation. Much of the
difference is driven by the underlying assumptions of the models used.
In their economic models, CBO and the Troika use different assumptions
regarding major economic variables such as inflation rates, interest rates,
unemployment and gross national product (GNP).91 In addition, in any
revenue estimate of the provisions of a tax bill, the assumptions about the
interactions of the various provisions are important. The order in which
the revenue estimates are made, which determines which provisions are
deemed to be in place when estimating other provisions can make a
TAXATION (1990) (reprinted in THE CAPITAL GAINS CONTROVERSY, supra note 15, at 99-100)
[hereinafter EXPLANATION OF METHODOLOGY].
87 Id. at 100. In addition, many law firms have hired economists, and often use their
own revenue estimates in lobbying for a proposal.
88 Id.
89 STATEMENT OF KENNETH W. GIDEON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF TAX POLICY, DE-
PARTmNT OF THE TREASURY BEFORE THE COMM. ON FNANCE, UNITED STATES SENATE (Mar.
28, 1990) (reprinted in THE CAIrrAL GAINS CONTROVERSY, supra note 15, at 108) [hereinafter
STATEMENT OF KENNETH W. GIDEON].
90 THE CAI'rrAL GAINS CONTROVERSY, supra note 15, at 100. For a review of several
studies of the impact of changes in capital gains taxes, see Eric Toder and Larry Ozane, How
Capital Gains Tax Rates Affect Revenues: The Historical Evidence, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFIcE REPORT (1988) (reprinted in part in THE CAPrrAL GAINS CONTROVERSY, supra note 76,
at 117). See also Jane G. Gravelle, Can A Capital Gains Tax Cut Pay for Itself?., 48 TAX
NoTEs 209 (reprinted in THE CAPIrAL GAINS CONTROVERSY, supra note 15, at 129). Another
concern is that projections are made for a limited number of years, but most of the effect of a
tax expenditure may occur in years that are beyond the projEctions. See, e.g., Ryan J.
Donmoyer & Eben Halberstam, House Bill's Tax Expenditures Vary Dramatically in Long-
Term Impact, 69 TAX NOTES 807 (1995).
91 Sunley & Weiss, supra note 79, at 460, 463. See also STEUER.E, supra note 70, at 52.
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significant difference in the outcome of the estimate.92 Similarly, the
way in which proposals are grouped can affect the revenue estimates.93
Usually the assumption is made that a tax change would not affect
macroeconomic variables such as total investment and gross national
product.94
There is often little information on which to base revenue esti-
mates, so that revenue estimators must use a great deal of judgment in
designing the analytic framework and deciding what assumptions to
make in forming their model. Because of this lack of information, the
models on which the revenue estimates are made reflect the creativity
and insights of the economic forecasters.95 Revenue estimators have to
make many judgment calls in deciding what assumptions are appropriate.
These assumptions then often drive the model. One former Treasury es-
timator reportedly said:
You look at an effect that you know is significant, and
there is no good data, and yet you are responsible for
producing an estimate by a given deadline. So you say
"Let's call it, let's call it, uh-20 percent." That's why
the estimators don't want to be second guessed-we all
know that many of the decisions we have to make are
indefensible. 96
The accuracy of these forecasts are seldom checked, as evidenced
by JCT's recent answer to a Congressional inquiry. On May 7, 1987, the
Republicans on the House Ways and Means Committee sent a letter to
JCT requesting information on the accuracy of revenue estimates that
were made in connection with major tax bills over the prior ten years.
Three years later, on June 6, 1990, the Joint Committee responded as
follows:
For two reasons, the Joint Committee staff does not un-
dertake the evaluation of prior revenue estimates. First,
92 Sunley & Weiss, supra note 79, at 461. Steuerle, in defense of the OTA estimates,
claims that OTA solely had the ability to make revenue estimates based on the economic
assumptions it was given. Others who wanted to show additional feedback effects "simply
needed to present to the public two sets of economic assumptions--one with the policy they
favored and one without. Revenue as well as expenditure effects would have followed."
STEuERLE, supra note 70, at 55-56 n.12.
93 Sunley & Weiss, supra note 79, at 462.
94 J. ANDREW HOERNER, Treasury's Capital Gains Estimates: Mr. Economist Goes to
Washington, 44 TAX NOTES 141 (1989) (reprinted in Tim CAPITAL GAINS CONTROVERSY,
supra note 15, at 76). Martin Feldstein has argued that revenue estimation should be done on a
more dynamic basis. That is, revenue estimation should take into account the predicted effects
of tax changes on taxpayer behavior. Martin Feldstein, The Case for Dynamic Analysis, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 14, 1994, at A14.
95 Sunley & Weiss, supra note 79, at 462-63.
96 Hoerner, supra note 94, at 75.
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as you know, our revenue estimating responsibility-to
provide revenue estimates and distributional analyses on
proposed or pending legislation-more than fully occu-
pies the time of our relatively small staff of revenue es-
timators. Second, evaluations of most prior year
estimates would themselves constitute estimates and,
therefore, in many instances an after-the-fact evaluation
would not be inherently any more reliable than the origi-
nal estimates ....
As you are aware, a revenue estimate attempts to predict
the changes in tax receipts that will result from a particu-
lar proposed change in the tax law. In preparing our es-
timates, we utilize the macroeconomic assumptions
provided to us by the Congressional Budget Office. It is
likely that differences between a prior year's estimate
and a current reestimate would be attributable in large
part to differences between the economic assumptions
projected at the time of the original estimate and the ac-
tual performance of the economy during the years in
question. It also would be necessary to take behavioral
responses into account in any reestimate. It is not possi-
ble in most instances to simply compare an aggregate
dollar number drawn from subsequent years' tax return
data with the original revenue estimate because, as you
know, virtually all estimates take into consideration tax-
payer behavior. For example, a reestimate of the limit
on the deductibility of personal interest expense included
in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 would have to include
not only a comparison of the amount of interest actually
claimed on tax returns following the 1986 Act but also
estimates of (1) how much otherwise nondeductible per-
sonal interest has been converted by taxpayers into de-
ductible interest under the home equity loan and
investment interest provisions of current law, (2) how
much previously deductible personal interest was ren-
dered nondeductible, not by the personal interest rules,
but by the 1986 Act passive loss rules, and (3) how any
change in interest deductions claimed by taxpayers was
influenced by the alternative minimum tax. Thus, be-
cause of the dependence of any reestimate on economic
1996]
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and behavioral assumptions, it is unlikely that we would
learn very much about the estimating process. 97
The letter goes on to say that the Joint Committee was advised that
CBO did perform some analysis of overall revenue effects of tax legisla-
tion, but did not make that analysis public. The OTA also calculated
estimates of the net effect of major tax legislation. However, it appears
that no specific forecasts were checked.
In addition to the difficulties mentioned in this letter, it is also im-
possible to know what activities were not undertaken or were abandoned
because of the tax law change.98 Further, the magnitude of even predict-
able effects is difficult to determine. For example, changes in corporate
tax rates can be expected to alter choice of business form and thus, while
a corporate rate cut may increase corporate tax revenue, it would be ex-
pected to decrease tax revenue from other business forms. This would
require what is called "off model adjustments," an adjustment that can-
not be made within a model. JCT acknowledges that these are some of
the most difficult adjustments to make, and must often be based in large
part on the judgment of the economists. 99 Also, as the letter indicates, it
is very difficult to check the accuracy ex post for any revenue estimate of
a tax change that will be affected by macroeconomic variables or by
taxpayer behavior.100 JCT, in its discussion of revenue methodology
states, "Unfortunately, cases frequently arise in which reliable data are
not available. In these situations, the estimating staff must rely on their
cumulative experience, guided by relevant economic theory to assess
possible behavioral responses resulting from proposed legislative
changes."101
Despite these difficulties, some attempts have been made to deter-
mine the accuracy of revenue estimates. The research and development
tax credit enacted by the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 was expected
to reduce tax liabilities by approximately $800 to $900 million a year.
The actual reduction in corporate tax liability ranged from $1.2 million to
over $1.6 million. When the maximum tax on earned income was re-
duced from 70 percent to 50 percent in 1972, it was believed the revenue
loss would be about $170 million. Ex post, the revenue loss was esti-
mated to be $271 million. The liberalization of the Individual Retire-
ment Account (IRA) deduction enacted in 1981 estimated that
97 Letter from Ronald A. Pearlman to the Honorable Bill Archer, June 6, 1990 (on file
with author). See also REVENUE ESTIMATION, supra note 82.
98 Sunley & Weiss, supra note 79, at 464.
99 REVENUE ESTIMATION, supra note 82, at 8.
100 Sunley & Weiss, supra note 79, at 465.
101 REVENUE ESTIMATION, supra note 82, at 6.
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deductions for IRA contributions would increase about $6 billion in
1984. The actual increase was $15 billion.102
Sunley and Weiss, after citing several examples where revenue esti-
mates were significantly inaccurate and discussing the underlying
problems of estimates, reject the idea that revenue estimators should give
a range of accuracy or a confidence level, or indicate the importance of
the accuracy of some of the underlying assumptions. Their reason is
interesting:
We are not persuaded that information of this sort would
serve any useful purpose, and it would be very subjective
anyway. Among other factors, the accuracy of an esti-
mate depends on the accuracy of all the assumptions as
to other economic quantities used to derive it, as well as
the correlations among these variables. Thus it would be
virtually impossible to derive a meaningful measure of
accuracy. 103
Sunley and Weiss are also concerned that making the process of
revenue estimation more open to scrutiny would decrease frank discus-
sion. Furthermore, they suggest that the models employ assumptions
based on "educated judgment" that may be difficult to support.1°4
A. CAPITAL GAINS: AN EXAMPLE
One area that clearly demonstrates the difficulty of forecasting the
effects of a change in tax laws is that of the rate of tax on capital gains.
Despite the fact that the tax has varied over time, so that historical infor-
mation is available, there is no consensus among economists about
whether a cut in the rate of capital gains taxation will raise or lose reve-
nue. Even within the government, the revenue estimates clash. Treasury
suggested that the administration's 1990 proposal to reduce the tax on
capital gains would increase tax receipts by $12.5 billion for fiscal years
1990-95, while JCT estimated that it would reduce tax revenue by $11.4
billion over that time frame. 10 5 Hearings before the Senate Finance
102 Sunley & Weiss, supra note 79, at 465. Estimation of the deficit is no more precise.
OMB increased its five year projection of deficits in 1991 by over $200 billion. The reasons
were at least partly due to events that were not foreseen and thus not built into their model.
One of these was the savings and loan debacle which created the need for revenue to cover
bank guarantees. The original projections were optimistic and would hold, if at all, only bar-
ring such unseen revenue demands. STEuERLa, supra note 70, at 174. See also MALABRE,
supra note 14, at 205.
103 Sunley & Weiss, supra note 79, at 470 (emphasis added). Sunley and Weiss also
argue that revenue estimation imposes some discipline on the tax legislative process. Id. at
469.
104 Id. at 470.
105 Id. at 467.
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Committee revealed that these differences were the result of different
assumptions about three aspects of taxpayer response to a capital gains
tax reduction. 106 C. Eugene Steuerle, former Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Tax Analysis, said, "If anyone tells you he knows what the revenue
consequences of a capital gains tax cut will be, don't believe him. '10 7
With respect to the capital gains tax, the arguments for and against a
capital gains exclusion have remained constant while Congress has
tinkered with the treatment of capital gains. What has also remained
constant is the inability to achieve any consensus on whether a capital
gains exclusion will raise revenue or ose revenue.' 08 For example, one
argument in favor of decreasing the tax on capital gains is to overcome
what is known as the "lock in effect." This effect occurs when taxpayers
stay in investments longer than would be efficient if there were no tax
simply because when they sell the asset, they will have to pay tax on
their gain. Thus, one question is to what extent realizations of capital
gains will increase as a result of a decrease in the tax on those gains.
OTA has argued that it is not enough to look at what has happened his-
torically after tax reductions on capital gains; one also must estimate
what would have happened to realizations and tax revenue if the tax law
had not changed. The analysis is, as a result, very sensitive to what as-
sumptions are made as to what would have happened.'0 9 In addition,
one has to consider both transitory and permanent changes. While there
may be a temporary increase in the number of realizations and a resulting
increase in tax revenue from capital gains as a result of a reduction in the
tax, this effect may not be permanent. The number of years after a tax
change that are considered in any study may make a difference in the
outcome of the study." 0 In addition, other taxpayer behavior that may
affect a revenue estimate is usually left out of revenue estimates. For
example, a capital gains tax reduction may induce taxpayers to shift their
investments from financial assets that produce interest and dividends to
those that produce capital gains.'
106 Id. at 467. These differences involved the short run and long run elasticity of capital
gains realizations-that is, to what extent taxpayers would increase selling capital assets be-
cause of the reduction in tax, and how long it would take to reach the long run.
107 See generally TmE CAPITAL GAINS CONTROVERSY, supra note 15.
108 For a summary of the arguments for and against a capital gains exclusion regardless of
the revenue effects, see Jane Gravelle and Lawrence Lindsey, Capital Gains, in THE CAPITAL
GAINS CONTROVERSY, supra note 15, at 17; Gerald E. Auten & Joseph J. Cordes, Policy
Watch: Cutting Capital Gains Taxation, 5 J. EcON. PERSP. 1 (1991); Walter J. Blum, A Handy
Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, in THE CAPITAL GAINS CONTROVERSY, supra note
15, at 31.
109 See generally REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE CAPITAL GAINS REDUCTIONS OF 1978,
Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of Treasury 151-87 (1985).
110 Id.
111 HOERNER, supra note 94, at 75-76.
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As a result, when President Bush proposed that the tax on capital
gains be reduced on a sliding scale based on how long the taxpayer had
held the asset by excluding a certain percentage of the capital gain from
taxation, the revenue effect of his proposal was hotly contested. Under
the proposal, assets held for one year would receive a 10 percent exclu-
sion, for two years, 20 percent, and for three years or more, 30 percent.
For an individual in the 28 percent bracket, the result would be a tax rate
of 25.2 percent for assets held for one year, 22.4 percent for two years,
and 19.6 percent for three years.' 12 OTA estimated the proposal would
raise tax revenue by $12.5 billion, while JCT predicted the proposal
would lose $11.4 billion over the same time frame - a difference of
$23.9 billion. Both agencies appeared before Congress to try to explain
the large difference in results. OTA argued that the difference was par-
tially due to the assumptions of the elasticity of tax revenues from sales
of capital assets from a change in the tax rate. OTA claimed that the
revenue maximizing rate was 23 percent and asserted that the JCT esti-
mate suggested that JCT thought it was 35 percent, higher than the then
maximum rate on ordinary income. 1 3 In addition, the JCT estimate as-
sumed a large increase in capital gains recognition even without a change
in the tax rate. 14 JCT responded that they believed the difference in the
two estimates was almost entirely because of different assumptions re-
garding elasticity-taxpayer responsiveness to changes in the tax
rates."15
Further, JCT said that their model suggested a revenue maximizing
rate of 28.5 percent, not 35 percent. 1 6 The JCT report stated, "While
the choice of an elasticity is ultimately a judgment call, the Joint Com-
mittee staff believes its elasticity assumption is more consistent with past
112 STATEMENT OF KENNEr W. GIDEON, supra note 89, at 86.
113 Id. at 81. Elasticity measures the responsiveness of taxpayers to a change in tax rates
in terms of the percentage change in capital gains realizations divided by the percentage
change in tax and indicates how much tax revenue would increase or decrease as a result of an
increase or decrease in the tax rate. If the elasticity is less than one, a tax reduction would lose
tax revenue because the increase in realizations would not be sufficient to offset the loss in
revenue. If the elasticity is greater than one, a tax reduction would increase revenue.
114 Id. OTA uses baseline assumptions of capital gain realizations derived from data pro-
vided by OMB, but officially the assumptions are treated as OMB's, while JCT uses baseline
assumptions provided by CBO. See EXPLANATION OF METHODOLOGY, supra note 27, at 90; J.
Andrew Hoerner, A Tale of Two Revenue Estimating Bodies: The Capital Gains Debate, 47
TAx NoTEs 378 (1990).
115 JCT used a revenue elasticity of 1.10 for the short run and 0.66 for the long run, and
assumed that the long run was reached after two years, while Treasury assumed an elasticity of
1.20 for the short run and 0.80 for the long run, and that the long run was reached after three
years. EXPLANATION OF METODOLOGY, supra note 86, at 93.
116 Id. at 94.
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history, and more likely to be an accurate predictor for the future than the
assumption used by the Treasury."' 1 7
The JCT also accused OTA of using a different method of analyzing
the distributional effects of the proposed capital gains reduction. The
distributional effect indicates which taxpayer groups, ranging from high
income to low income, will most benefit from a change in the law. The
report states, "The Joint Committee staff does not believe this so-called
dynamic analysis presents a theoretically correct measure of the relative
tax benefits of the Administration proposal to taxpayers at different in-
come levels."118
The JCT report went on to criticize the Treasury's presentation of
the academic and empirical literature. 119 Treasury in turn criticized the
JCT report for not revealing the details of their models as Treasury had
done. Further, Treasury said the report confirmed that JCT had changed
its elasticity estimates from what it had used in prior years. Treasury
also criticized JCT from choosing its elasticity estimate based on time-
series studies while rejecting the results from cross sectional studies,
which produce higher elasticities. The Treasury testimony indirectly ac-
cused the JCT of only relying on studies which supported their biases.120
Jane Gravelle, an economist at the Congressional Research Service, ar-
gued that both Treasury and JCT might be too optimistic. 12 1
The differences in the elasticity indicated by various studies result
largely from differences in the types of studies used - cross section,
time series, or panel studies. Gravelle examined the shortcomings of the
models used for revenue estimation and has remarked:
There is a host of both econometric and theoretical
problems associated with these studies, many of which
are detailed in the studies themselves. Many of these
problems are common to both types of studies. For ex-
ample, none of the studies really captures well the basic
theory of realizations behavior, in part because that the-
ory itself is not really developed. Individuals may real-
ize gains for consumption purposes which would require
an extremely complex overlapping generations life cycle
model. They may wish simply to switch assets either
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 99-103.
120 STATEMENT OF KENNETH W. GIDEON, supra note 89, at 107-08.
121 J. Andrew Hoerner, JCT and Treasury Both Off Mark in Estimating Revenue Effects
of Capital Gains Cut, CRS Finds, 50 TAX NoTEs 1329 (1991). This article examines both the
strengths and weaknesses of Gravelle's report and concludes that more attention should be
paid to developing the underlying theory of realizations, macroeconomic implications of a
capital gains tax cut, and ways to check the consistency of the assumptions with the data.
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because they have changed expectations or they wish to
rebalance their portfolios. These theories do, however,
tend to suggest that the major source-in some models,
the only source-of permanent changes in realizations is
the selling of assets otherwise held until death. If indi-
viduals are not very willing to sell assets that they other-
wise intend to hold until death, then a cut in the capital
gains tax might yield a temporary response, but not a
permanent one .... Yet, none of the studies really cap-
ture these dynamic elements, and with one exception
they did not include changes in accrued unrealized gains
as an explanatory variable.122
She further explained that a portfolio response, resulting in a shift-
ing of assets, may occur both because of a change in relative rates be-
tween capital gains and ordinary income and because of changes in
depreciation and inflation rates, among others. The simplifications re-
quired by the studies are problematic, given the complexity of the
question. 123
B. THE POLITICS OF REVENUE ESTIMATION
Politics clearly affect economic forecasting as well. The huge
budget deficit that arose in 1982 was partially the result of polices en-
acted by the Reagan Administration which were supported by
econometrics based on unrealistically high predicted growth in GNP.124
One of the forecasts by Murray Weidenbaum, chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisors, predicted significant GNP growth, as did the other
two factions in the core of Reagan's economic advisors, the supply-
siders and the monetarists.'2 Table 1, taken from David Stockman's
The Triumph of Politics,126
122 Jane G. Gravelle, Can A Capital Gains Tax Cut Pay for Itself?., 48 TAX NOTES 209
(1990) (footnote omitted). This article specifically addressed the shortcomings of cross-sec-
tion and time series studies. See also JANE G. GRAV .LE, THE ECONOMIC EFFEcrs OF TAXING
CAPrrAL INCOME (1994).
123 GRAvELLE, supra note 122, at 132.
124 DAVID STocKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF POLMCS 106 (1986).
125 When Weidenbaum was asked what model his forecast had come from, he reportedly
"slapped his belly" and replied, "It came right out of here. My visceral computer." Id. at 106.
126 Id. at 108
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SELECTED GNP FORECASTS AND ACTUAL OUTCOME
FINAL
YEAR: SUPPLY-SIDE WEIDENBAUM ACTUAL
QUARTER CONSENSUS FORECAST OUTCOME
1981:4 4.0 percent 4.0 percent -5.3 percent
1982:1 9.4 percent 5.2 percent -5.5 percent
1982:2 7.8 percent 5.2 percent 0.9 percent
1982:3 6.8 percent 5.2 percent -1.0 percent
1982:4 5.4 percent 5.2 percent -1.3 percent
suggests how misguided these estimates of real GNP growth were.
Stockman writes, "We were betting the fiscal house of the United
States on our ability to predict the precise shape and composition of a $4
trillion economy all the way out to 1986."127 Even a small error in the
estimate of baseline spending levels created major problems for the fiscal
policy.128 The political abuse of economic forecasting was, of course,
not limited to the Republicans. The Democrats, in their attempt to fore-
stall the Reagan budget, artificially raised their revenue estimates, sug-
gested phantom savings, and "fudged" defense spending.1 29
Shortly after Congress passed the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, the administration and the CBO developed new budget estimates.
These estimates suggested an $80 billion deficit for 1982. However, the
CBO's economic assumptions were overly optimistic.' 30 Eventually,
Martin Feldstein, as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, was
reportedly successful in making the administration use more realistic
economic assumptions.' 31
Although efforts are made to shield the revenue estimators in the
OTA from political pressure, there is enough leeway in assumptions and
decisions that affect the technical analysis that often these can be
tinkered with to obtain results that are defensible while ultimately sup-
porting the Administration position. There is evidence that such action
was taken to reconcile the 1985 OTA report, which suggested that a capi-
tal gains reduction increases revenue or only marginally decreases reve-
nue, with the 1986 revenue estimates supporting a revenue increase if the
127 Il at 145. Stockman was reported to have said, "None of us really understands what's
going on with all these numbers." Peter Carlson, The Truth ... But Not the Whole Truth,
WASH. PosT MAO., June 4, 1995, at 13-14. This article is an amusing but disheartening ac-
count of one reporter's attempt to understand various statistics that were being bandied about
in Washington.
128 STOCKMAN, supra note 124, at 163.
129 Id. at 188. However, Stockman contends that the Democrats were right in the realiza-
tion that the Reagan budget would create permanent large budget deficits in the future and that
the Democratic budget should have won. Id. at 188, 192.
130 STEUERLE, supra note 70, at 58.
131 Id. at 66.
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tax on net capital gain was increased from a maximum of 20 percent to a
maximum of 28 percent. 132
Another form of political pressure was evidenced by the fact that
although OTA had completed their analysis of the 1978 capital gains
reductions in 1983, the study was not released until 1985. Several for-
mer Treasury economists reported that the release was stopped by Treas-
ury's Office of Economic Policy (OEP) because it did not show a
sufficiently big increase in revenue from rate reduction to satisfy the sup-
ply-siders.133
"It was the difference between saying that you might be
better off with a slightly lower gains rate and insisting
that the cuts are a major engine of economic growth"
said Ballantine [Dr. Gregory Ballantine, deputy assistant
secretary for tax analysis in 1983]. "The 1983 version of
the report was ambiguous about the 1981 Act. The OEP
was unhappy with that."'134
Another Treasury source reportedly said, 'The report didn't go far
enough for them. It was a cautious document and they wanted to see
something more like cheerleading."'13 5
While the differences in revenue estimates regarding a capital gains
rate reduction may have been based on legitimate professional differ-
ences, the fact that Treasury's estimates supported the President while
JCT's supported the opposition of the Democratically controlled Con-
gress, the great disparity in the estimates (not just in amount but also in
direction), and the sparring between the two agencies, makes one skepti-
cal about the reliability of the entire process. In addition, the revenue
estimators are not entirely free to choose all their underlying assump-
tions, which may bias the results even given independence with respect
to the rest of the model.' 36 As one reporter stated:
In Washington, there are no right or wrong numbers;
there are Democratic numbers or Republican numbers,
Treasury Department numbers or Congressional Budget
132 HOERNER, supra note 94, at 77-78.
133 Id. at 76.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Eugene Steuerle, Estimates and Guesstimates-How Much Can the Numbers
Change?, 69 TAx NoTEs 1141 (1995). Mr. Steuerle argues that revenue estimators have a
great deal of integrity with respect to their estimations, given the economic assumptions they
must use in their models. He also suggests that while there is some room for manipulation of
economic assumptions, there is less ability to do this than popularly thought, given the need
for consistency. However, he also ponders, "I wonder what our Founding Fathers would have
thought of raising the inexact science and blunt art of economic prediction, along with expen-
diture and revenue estimating, to such an extraordinary pinnacle." Id.
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Office numbers. Washington is a place where three gov-
ernmental organizations calculate personal income in
three different ways, thus producing three conflicting
sets of numbers that are then extrapolated to create the
conflicting statistics that are used to "prove" conflicting
political points. 137
In addition, the revenue estimates often have to be made under tre-
mendous time pressure. Tax legislation can produce a tremendous work-
load that has to be done under tight deadlines, and those responsible for
the revenue estimates are not given the time or the resources that they
need.138 In some instances, the quality of the data available has actually
declined.139 As one observer summarized, "The answer is that the cur-
rent system requires too few revenue estimators to produce too many
estimates in too short a time frame, with too few opportunities for input
from unbiased private sources of information."' 140 One JCT staffer re-
portedly said that on two days notice, JCT staff was asked to complete
revenue estimates on over 150 old and new requests for revenue esti-
mates needed for a markup of tax proposals. 141 Private businesses, even
with fewer time and resource constraints, have decreased their reliance
on economic forecasting. 142 Perhaps it is time for Congress to do so
also.
V. THE ROAD AHEAD
Where do we go from here if the consequences of frequent tax legis-
lation are disruptive to the market, revenue estimation is an imprecise
tool, but yet there is a great deal of dissatisfaction with the current tax
system? I recommend a return to "principle" centered legislation. First,
Congress should take seriously the impact that its frequent tinkering with
the tax laws has on entrepreneurs and realize that it is imposing signifi-
cant costs on the economy as a whole from its legislative activity. Sec-
ond, Congress should realize that it is not able to accurately predict the
effect that the changes its makes will have. These two facts should result
in Congress slowing down the pace of tax legislation, and making and
keeping a public commitment to that end. Such an action would accom-
plish two goals. Business could absorb the changes already made and
adjust, and Congress could wait and see what happens to the economy.
137 Carlson, supra note 127, at 13-14.
138 HOERNER, supra note 94, at 77.
139 MALABRE, supra note 14, at 206.
140 Rob Bennett, Every Number tells a Story, 50 TAX NoTEs 91 (1991).
141 Rob Bennett, The Revenue Estimator-Client Privilege, 50 TAx NoTs 407 (1991).
142 MALABRE, supra note 14, at 210-13.
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In addition, tax policy should be based on a set of chosen principles
so that any suggested change or wholesale reform can be evaluated ac-
cording to whether it advances the underlying goal or not. Before the tax
laws are changed yet again, serious consideration needs to be given to
what our goals are, and then efficiency and equity criteria should be used
to evaluate means for reaching those goals.143
Any statement of a goal for the tax system is by its nature a norma-
tive one.144 With that caveat, tax policy must take into account three
fundamental principles: 1) respect for the market process; 2) the need for
the United States to be able to compete effective in the ever increasingly
global economy; and 3) the need for the tax system to conform to an
articulated concept of fairness. 145
Congress must understand that the market process is a discovery
process. Entrepreneurs must make complex decisions in the midst of
rapidly changing technology and increasing global competition. Infor-
mation is disseminated in the market through price signals. If the tax
system creates noise in the signals, it will disrupt the allocation of re-
sources to their most highly valued uses.
Congress must also take into account the need for American busi-
nesses to be internationally competitive. Rosabeth Moss Kantor com-
ments, "Today, the world economy is in a period of rapid and dramatic
change, and the question of just how we will connect to this new world is
the single most important issue of our lifetime."' 46
The American tax system was designed in an American economy
that was isolated from the rest of the world and did not have to compete
with foreign countries that have now caught up and in some instances
surpassed U.S. industries.' 47 Meanwhile, American industrial plants and
equipment have aged, along with its work force.' 48 Also, as the global
marketplace continues to grow, the need to be in any particular geo-
143 Sheldon Cohen, a former IRS Commissioner, argues that it would be impossible to
have a simple system of taxation in the complex world we live in and that Congress should
work to improve the system we have now. Sheldon S. Cohen, Taming the Tax Code, 68 TAx
Nomas 1495 (1995).
144 Pollack, supra note 14, at 499.
145 The difficulty of the fairness criteria arises because of the subjectiveness of what is
fair. Even the contours of the generally accepted principles of horizontal equity and vertical
equity are subject to widespread debate. For example, if two taxpayers have the same amount
of earned income, but the first has a mortgage and can take a deduction for interest paid on that
mortgage, is it equitable or not that the second taxpayer will pay more taxes?
146 Kanter, supra note 39, at 17.
147 Id. at 17, 26-28.
148 Id. at 21.
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graphical area diminishes. 149 In fact, many companies have centers in
many different countries.1 50
At the same time, as the competitive ability of other countries in-
creases, domestic businesses find more of a global market open to them.
This is true not only for large companies, but even for small ones. In
fact, Rosabeth Kantor suggests that to be successful, companies will have
to become engaged in the global economy. 151 Both capital and labor
have become more globally mobile.152
If the United States is going to be competitive in the global market,
the tax structure must not discourage businesses from locating here and
must not impose tax burdens on domestic companies that make it impos-
sible to compete in the world market. This should be the overarching tax
policy issue. Any reform measure and any amendment to the Internal
Revenue Code should be judged by whether it promotes or impedes U.S.
companies from being competitive. In the short run, this concern may
simply mean freezing tax bills so that the tax structure is stable. In the
long run, it may necessitate comprehensive tax reform which takes into
account the tax structures of the countries with which the U.S. must com-
pete for business.
The fairness criteria is, in many ways, the most difficult due to the
subjectiveness of what is fair. Even the use of the generally accepted
principles of horizontal equity and vertical equity has no real prescriptive
value due to different ideas of what is fair. For example, if two taxpayers
have the same amount of earned income, but the first has a mortgage and
can take a deduction for interest paid on that mortgage, is it equitable or
not that the second taxpayer will pay more taxes? Is progressivity in tax
rates "fair," and if so, how much progressivity? While there may be no
hope for agreement on these issues, any proposal for tax reform should
be able to articulate what fairness criteria it is based on and why the
proponents believe that system is at least as fair, and hopefully, more fair
than the current one.' 53
149 Id. at 29.
150 Id. at 46. Kanter provides many examples. One of them is Hewlett-Packard, which
"has its corporate headquarters in Palo Alto, California, but its world center for medical equip-
ment in Boston; for personal computer business in Grenoble, France; for fiber-optic research in
Germany; for computer-aided engineering software development in Australia; and for laser
printers in Singapore." Id. at 47.
151 Id. at 28, 53.
152 Id. at 42. The United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations reported that over
the last twenty years the number of multinational companies has grown from 7000 to 35,000.
United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations, World Investment Report (1994) (cited
in HEILBRONER AND MILBERG, THE CRISIS OF VISION IN MODERN ECONOMIC THOUGHT 121
(1995)).
153 Interestingly, Heilbroner and Millberg argue that one of the reason there are so many
"warring camps" in economics today is that there is no fundamental consensus regarding the
"justice and reasonableness of the social order." Id. at 9, 15. See also GEOFFREY BRENNAN &
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Viewing the market as a discovery process and the United States as
a competitor in a world market for capital and for highly skilled labor
provides a framework for tax reform efforts. At the same time, any tax
reform effort should conform to a clearly articulated fairness criteria. No
major tax reform bills should be passed until it can be analyzed accord-
ing to these principles.
VI. CONCLUSION
American business needs a tax system that will provide a stable en-
vironment that supports the market process, not an ever-changing institu-
tion that creates another element of uncertainty and that interferes with
entrepreneurial decision-making. Austrian capital theory provides in-
sight into the market process that should be taken into account in the tax
legislative process. Recent tax legislation has created instability without
any ability to measure the economic impact of that instability. Less reli-
ance should be placed on revenue estimation and more on underlying
principles. Most importantly, with respect to our tax system, we need to
provide American entrepreneurs with better maps and a more stable
landscape.
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